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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the existence of knowledge spillovers, differences in the 
capacity of fi rms to assimilate them and disparities in some human resource management 
practices are related with the decision to innovate of Spanish fi rms. In order to do this, we 
employ data from the “Central de Balances” database, which covers both manufacturing and 
services fi rms during the period 2003-2007, and use an estimator proposed by Wooldridge 
(2005) for dynamic random effects discrete choice models. The empirical exercise provides 
evidence on the positive link between spillovers and the innovative behaviour of companies, 
not just for the knowledge generated in the same industry, but also for that generated in 
the same region or by the public sector. Moreover, this link is stronger for those fi rms with 
a higher capacity to absorb those spillovers. This ability not only works through fi rms’ R&D 
capabilities, but also through such factors as the quality of the labour force, the share of 
temporary employment and the amount of resources spent in training. In addition to these 
factors, we fi nd that innovation performance exhibits a high degree of inertia. Further, some 
other observed fi rm characteristics, such as size, sales growth, export behaviour, sector 
capital intensity or fi nancial structure variables, are also found to be relevant determinants 
of the likelihood of innovation.
Keywords: innovation, R&D, spillovers, absorptive capacity, skilled labour, temporary 
employment, dynamic RE probit model.
JEL classifi cation: O32, C23, C25, J6, J24, L00.
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1 Introduction 
There is a widespread consensus that globalisation and the increasing importance of the 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) have substantially changed the economic 
landscape across the world. This profound transformation, along with the incorporation of 
emerging market economies to international trade, has undermined the competitiveness 
of European countries in the global stage. In response to this situation, the European Council 
launched the Lisbon Agenda in 2000 with the strategic objective of transforming 
Europe into the most competitive and dynamic economy of the world by 2010. In order 
to achieve such an ambitious target, reforms were proposed in five different policy areas, 
most importantly, in the development of the new knowledge economy, where the role of R&D 
investment was deemed as crucial, a dimension in which some countries, Spain among them, 
have been lagging behind.1 
Given this challenging starting point, Spain has made a substantial effort to catch up 
with the rest of Europe in terms of innovation and technology progress, increasing public 
funding for civilian R&D activities by 25% on average every year between 2004 and 2008. 
The result is that the gap in public R&D spending between Spain and its European peers was 
closed in 2008. The gap in private R&D spending continues to be, however, very large: 0.6% 
of GDP in Spain against 1.2% in EU15 and 1.9% in the US. Moreover, according to a very 
recent European Commission publication,2 only 21 Spanish companies are included in the 
ranking of the top 1000 R&D European firms, and their combined R&D spending amounts 
barely to 1% of the total private R&D spending within the EU.3 These figures compare poorly 
with the 247 British firms in the ranking, which represent together about 15% of total private 
R&D in the EU, 209 German ones, which account for more than one-third of R&D, or the 70 
Swedish firms accounting for 5% of total EU R&D. 
This paper shows that the Spanish innovation system could be paying a double 
toll for this deficit in terms of private sector R&D spending: on the one hand, the lack 
of independent R&D effort affects directly the capacity of private firms to innovate; on the 
other hand, it diminishes their capability to benefit from spillovers generated by 
knowledge produced elsewhere, that is, it is affecting firms’ absorptive capacity [Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989) and Geroski (1995)]. The role of independent R&D effort to enhance the 
capacity to absorb and incorporate knowledge generated elsewhere into the production 
process of a firm —whether generated by other firms in the same sector of activity or in the 
same region, or by the public sector—, has already been well documented [see, for example, 
Jaffe (1986)]. We find that, in the case of Spain, the marginal benefit of knowledge spillovers 
on a firm’s probability of innovation increases six-fold when the firm carries out its own R&D 
activity, as compared to a firm with no R&D spending. That is, the observed private R&D 
underinvestment could be undermining the innovative capabilities of Spain more than 
previously believed, as well as decreasing the return on public R&D investment. 
The second contribution of the paper is more general, although it has important 
implications for the particular case of Spain. We show that a firm’s absorptive capacity is 
                                                                          
1. According to the OECD, in 1999 only 0.9% of GDP was devoted to R&D in Spain, vis-à-vis 1.9% in the EU15 
and 2.6% in the US. 
2. The 2009 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. 
3. Furthermore, 40% of that was due to the R&D spending of only one firm, telecommunications company Telefónica. 
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strongly related with its human capital, which we understand in a broad sense here. 
More concretely, we find that the skill composition of the workforce and the provision of 
on-the-job training increase the probability of being innovative not directly, but because they 
raise the capacity of a firm to benefit from technology spillovers stemming from a third party. 
The use of fixed-term contracts, on the other hand, seems to be directly related with the 
innovation performance of a firm, as it has been proven elsewhere possibly due to the low 
motivation and training possibilities of employees on temporary contracts.4 
The idea that human capital might enhance a firm’s ability to absorb external 
knowledge is not new. Cohen and Levinthal (1990 and 1994), for instance, argue convincingly 
that the absorptive capacity of a firm is the by-product of three factors: its R&D activities, 
its production experience and, lastly, its personnel technical training. Hall and Mairesse (2006) 
claim that the technical training of the employees or other human resource management 
decisions are important for innovation because a firm’s knowledge is embedded in the human 
capital of its employees. Hence, the capacity of the company to understand and incorporate 
knowledge produced elsewhere will depend not only on its spending on R&D, but also on 
the expertise and know-how of its personnel. Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) confirm this 
view finding that highly educated workers have a comparative advantage with respect to 
the adjustment and implementation of new technologies. Vinding (2006) finds as well that 
updating the skills of the employees is crucial for innovation in technology-advanced sectors. 
There is some empirical evidence that supports the importance of human capital as 
a determinant of the absorptive capacity of spillovers at the country level. Coe, Helpman 
and Hoffmaister (1997), Engelbretcht (1997), Frantzen (2000) and Griffith et al. (2004), for 
example, relate a country’s TFP growth with its exposure to international technology spillovers 
and its capacity to benefit from them, proxied by own R&D and the qualification of the labour 
force.5 At a firm level, however, the role played by the quality of the labour force to shape the 
absorptive capacity is much less documented. Vinding (2006) and Ramijn and Albalejo (2002) 
are two of the few papers exploring this issue. They find that firms with more qualified 
personnel, as well as with up-to-date technical skills, are more innovative and argue that 
this is the result of the role of human capital as enhancer of a firm’s absorptive capacity of 
external knowledge. However, they fail to include an interaction term between the firm’s 
human capital and the spillover pool in the regression in order to quantify the amplifying effect 
of the variable.6 
This paper is an attempt to quantify the enhancing effect of absorptive capacity on 
the innovation performance of Spanish firms. Absorptive capacity will be determined 
by the firm´s own independent R&D effort but also by human capital variables, such as the 
qualification of the workforce, the provision of on-the-job training or the use of temporary 
contracts. In order to do so, we estimate a dynamic random effects probit model —which 
allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity, for endogeneity and to handle the initial 
conditions problem— and use a new database resulting from the combination of detailed 
firm-level information for a sample of Spanish firms compiled by the Bank of Spain and a 
survey on firms’ innovative activities managed by the Spanish National Statistic Institute. 
                                                                          
4. See for example the work of Michie and Sheehan (1999 and 2003). 
5. All four papers find that countries further from the technology frontier catch up faster the more educated their labour 
force. The reason is that they are able to benefit to a greater extent from technology spillovers stemming from the more 
advanced countries. 
6. As proposed by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) in their seminal paper. 
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We also study the role played by spillovers generated by different types of 
knowledge capital. Hence, we proxy the stock of external knowledge —in other words, the 
spillover pool— by the R&D capital stock of firms operating in the same sector of activity or 
region, giving therefore some information as on whether sector or regional spillovers are more 
important, and the R&D capital stock generated by the public sector. We find that they are all 
relevant for the decision to innovate. 
Given the fact that Spanish firms are not only lagging behind R&D spending, but also 
in most of those human resource practices studied here,7 these results have important 
policy implications. In order to change the Spanish productive system from one based on 
low productivity activities, such as construction and tourism, to one based on knowledge 
and innovation it will not be enough to devote large quantities of public resources to R&D; 
policy-makers would have to make sure as well that Spanish firms are able to benefit from 
that effort. 
The next section reviews briefly the literature on spillovers and absorptive capacity 
of firms. Section 3 describes the database used in the paper. Section 4 explains in detail 
the empirical methodology and variables included in the analysis and section 5 presents the 
econometric results. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                                          
7. According to the OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators and Eurostat, the temporary rate in Spain triples that 
in other European countries and the percentage of firms which provide on-the-job training is about 15pp below that in 
EU25 and almost half of that in the UK. Further, the percentage of skilled workers (persons with at least secondary 
education) is 10pp lower than in France and the UK (44% against 65% and 69%, respectively), and almost half of that 
in Germany. 
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2 Literature review 
This paper explores the determinants of the innovation performance of firms and, therefore, 
it takes some elements of the methodological framework from the seminal paper of 
Crépon et al. (1998). However, the main focus of the paper is on the role played by spillovers 
and their interaction with the absorptive capacity of a firm. The impact of knowledge 
spillovers has remained the primary focus of research in economic growth since the work 
of Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) on endogenous growth models. In this type of 
models, the main input of the aggregate knowledge production function, assumed to have 
constant returns to scale (CRS), is research and development. Hence, more R&D leads to an 
increasing economic growth rate. The CRS assumption has been extensively confirmed 
at the aggregate level [see Griliches (1990) and Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002)]. However, 
micropanel evidence persistently shows diminishing returns to scale [see Hall et al. (1986) 
and Blundell et al. (2002)]. Griliches (1979) reconciles both observations, the existence of 
CRS in the knowledge production function at the aggregate level and DRS at the firm- 
or industry-level, by means of the existence of knowledge spillovers: one firm’s R&D efforts 
may contribute positively to another firm’s innovation performance. 
The existence of knowledge spillovers, estimated to be quite large by, for example, 
Jaffe (1986),8 is very relevant for the discussion on the need, or the lack thereof, of 
public intervention to foster innovative activities. Common wisdom is that knowledge 
is a public good, that is, it is non-rival and non-excludable. Hence, a firm investing in 
knowledge has no means to appropriate the returns from that investment, which would 
discourage research activities. Moreover, as pointed out by Mansfield et al. (1981), the cost of 
imitating research done by other firms is much lower than the cost of generating original 
research.9 The result of this difference between the private and social R&D return is an 
underinvestment in knowledge generation. In this context, public intervention would be 
justified to, among other things, increase appropriability –through the patent system. 
However, too much appropriability reduces spillovers and, according to Spence (1984), could 
result in an incorrect pricing of R&D results. The reason is that full appropriability would deter 
one firm from building on the research done by other firms. Hence, there would be an 
overinvestment in overlapping R&D activities. The result would be that innovation is achieved 
at a too high cost. 
However, according to Geroski (1995), the existence of a dilemma between the 
negative incentive effect of spillovers and their positive impact on other firms’ innovation 
outcomes is not such if one takes into account the fact that, in order to benefit from 
spillovers, firms have to undertake their own R&D. That is, if one takes into account the 
double face of R&D, in Cohen and Levinthal (1989) wording, both as a direct innovation 
determinant and as an indirect promoter of one firms’ capacity to absorb, understand and 
include into its own production process research done by another party, spillovers do not 
have necessarily to result in less private R&D [see Bernstein and Nadiri (1989)]. 
The role of independent R&D as the driver of the ability of a firm to acquire and make 
use of the R&D activities of others, that is, to take full advantage of knowledge spillovers, has 
                                                                          
8. Jaffe (1986) estimates that if all firms increased R&D spending by 10%, total patents would increase by 20% with 
more than half the increase coming from a pure spillover effect. 
9. He estimates that on average imitation costs are about 65% of the original innovation costs. 
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been most convincingly pushed forward by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Geroski (1995) 
in a microeconomic context. At an aggregate level, Griffith et al. (2003 and 2004) propose 
and test a theoretical model of technological transfer which encompasses endogenous 
growth and the dual role of R&D, to produce innovation and to assimilate others’ discoveries. 
One of the main implications of their model is that the social rate of return of R&D will be 
underestimated unless its role to promote absorptive capacity is taken into account. 
Jaffe (1986) estimates quantitatively a patent/profit equation at the firm level where the 
explanatory variables are the size of the spillover pool and its interaction with the firm’s own 
R&D effort finding a large direct effect of spillovers. He also finds that, given a certain 
spillover pool, firms with more R&D spending benefit more from it. Also at a firm level, Levin 
et al. (1987) survey a sample of US firms to explore how firms do actually protect their 
inventions and learn about others innovations. On average, independent R&D was ranked 
as the most effective means of learning about rival technology.10 
However, R&D spending is by no means the only determinant of a firm’s absorptive 
capacity. On a theoretical level, Acemoglu (2007) argues that, due to the complementarities 
between technology and workforce skills, if the job turnover rate increases —for instance, due 
to a high prevalence of temporary employment—, then the firm does not invest in new 
technology or on-the-job training for workers, because the additional return on training or on 
R&D would benefit a worker who will probably soon leave the firm and benefit a rival company 
with its knowledge. Further, if workers do not expect firms to invest in new technology or 
in training, then their wages may not be high enough for them to invest in human capital 
accumulation. Empirically, at a country level, Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2004) use a 
panel of 16 countries to estimate their respective TFP growth elasticity to business, public 
sector and foreign stocks of R&D and explore the role of a country’s absorptive capacity 
to explain observed differences. They find that both countries’ independent R&D and 
education levels can explain most of the estimated differences. Using a similar framework, 
but data for both developed and developing countries, Bosch et al. (2005) find that the 
gap in the elasticity of patent counts to R&D found between these two groups of countries 
can be fully explained by differences in patenting protection legislation and education, which 
enters as a determinant of a country’s absorptive capacity. Along these same lines, Eaton 
and Kortum (1996) fit OECD data to a growth model of technology diffusion to find that a 
country´s level of education significantly facilitates its ability to adopt foreign technology. 
Other aspects weakly related to a firm’s human capital, such as flexible work 
practices or human resource management techniques, have also been found to significantly 
affect firms’ innovation performance. Grabowski (1968) was the first to claim that temporary 
hiring and firing of researchers might be particularly costly in innovating firms. The first reason 
is that the supply of researchers is relatively inelastic, which increases the adjustment 
cost of the workforce in innovative firms. The second reason is that, if fired, employees can 
transfer part of the firm’s knowledge to a competitor. Much more recently, Michie and 
Sheehan (1999 and 2003) have estimated using a sample of UK firms that several human 
resource practices, the extensive use of fixed-term contracts among them, have an important 
direct impact on the innovative capacity of firms. One of the possible reasons for this 
result is provided in Albert et al. (2005), who find that workers on temporary contracts 
have a lower probability of receiving on-the-job training, because firms are less interested in 
investing in specific human capital due to higher turnover rates. Also, temporary employees 
may be intrinsically less “effective” (or less qualified) and could suffer from lack of motivation 
                                                                          
10. In the context of productivity analysis, Harhoff (2000) and Beneito (2001) inter alia find evidence in favour of spillover 
effects rising with R&D to sales ratios, which would be in line with the absorptive capacity hypothesis. 
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as they have low chances to become permanent employees [Dolado and Stucchi (2008)]. 
In the context of an innovative firm this could bear an important cost in terms of firm’s 
performance. 
However, as far as we can see there is no paper that explores whether this type 
of human resource practices have as well an impact on firms’ absorptive capacity. That is, 
whether their actual impact on innovation is underestimated due to the omission of one of the 
channels of transmission, as it happens in the case of independent R&D. 
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3 The database 
In this paper we use firm-level information from the “Central de Balances” (CB) of the Bank 
of Spain. Since 1983, the CB has been compiling and publishing aggregate information of 
collaborating firms’ balance sheets in order to follow the economic situation of the private 
non-financial Spanish sector. The information is provided on voluntary grounds every year by 
a substantial number of established companies, about 9000 non-financial firms in 2007.11 
Collaborating firms fill a questionnaire with detailed accounting information, as well as some 
other additional information —of great interest for our study— such as employment, skilled 
composition of the workforce, type of contracts, training spending or, since 1991, R&D 
expenditures. The information for the current and the previous period is provided every year 
to improve the quality of the data and reduce missing points. Moreover, about 75% of firms 
are re-contacted to clarify some datum or fill in gaps, and more than 200 basic quality 
controls are run on a routine basis. Hence, the quality of the data is outstanding. 
On the negative side, the selection of firms does not intend to be representative 
of the population, but rather depends on their voluntary cooperation with the Bank. 
This implies that some sectors are better represented than others. Particularly, as one can 
see in Table 1, the energy sector is very well covered, with a value-added coverage 
rate of over 70%. Industry and market services —especially trade, post, transport and 
telecommunications—, are quite well covered: collaborating firms account for about 30% 
of value added and about 20% of total employment in industry, and 20% and about 23%, 
respectively, in the market service sector. On the other hand, agriculture, mineral extraction 
and construction (grouped under “other”) have a less than 10% coverage rate, both in 
terms of value added and employment.12 Another important source of bias is the 
larger-than-average size of collaborating firms. In the industry sector, for example, about 
50% of firms in the sample had less than 250 employees, against more than 95% in the 
population. Lastly, the geographical location of firms is assigned according to the fiscal 
address of headquarters. Hence, the coverage rate in Madrid, the Basque Country and 
Catalonia is larger than that in other regions, amounting to 60%, 23% and 20%, respectively. 
For the current study we use three different samples of firms (Table 2). The first one, 
labeled the “extended” sample, is an unbalanced panel for about 2,500 firms during the 
period 1991-2007. The only requirement for a firm to be in this sample is to remain, at least, 
four consecutive years in it. The second sample is labeled the “restricted” sample. It is a 
balanced panel of almost 800 firms spanning from 2002 to 2007; hence, each firm has 6 
years of information. Lastly, the third sample is labeled “CB-PITEC” and results from merging 
the CB dataset with the PITEC database. PITEC (Panel de Innovación Tecnológica) is a panel 
of firms managed by the National Statistics Institute, the Spanish Foundation for Science and 
Technology and COTEC containing detailed information about innovation outputs and inputs, 
as well as other related information, for the period 2003 to 2007.13 The panel includes more 
than 70% of all Spanish firms with 200 employees or more (one-third of those large firms 
perform innovative activities) and a sample of firms with less than 200 employees with a 
substantial bias in favor of firms performing innovative activities. Using the firms’ fiscal 
                                                                          
11. Self-employed are not included. In 2007, about 50% of collaborating firms were Corporations and 45% Limited 
Liability Companies. The rest were mainly cooperatives. 
12. Firms are classified into the different economic sectors according to their main activity. 
13. For more information on PITEC and access to aggregate data, refer to the webpage http://sise.fecyt.es. 
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identification number, we were able to incorporate some relevant information —more on this 
below— provided by PITEC to about 500 firms of our dataset during the period 2003-2007. 
Table 2 shows the percentage of innovating firms in each of the samples, as well as 
other characteristics, such as the sector and size distribution.14 The restricted sample retains 
30% of firms from the extended sample, with the same share of innovative firms (25%). 
In addition, the restricted sample is similar to the extended one in terms of the sector 
distribution as well as in other relevant characteristics, such as the export share or the portion 
of firms quoted in a stock market. On the other hand, it increases somewhat the bias towards 
larger firms. As regards the CB-PITEC sample, it loses one year and 40% of firms with 
respect to the restricted sample. Besides, it has 10 percentage points more innovators, but a 
similar sector distribution, which is a bit biased towards industrial firms. The size bias 
worsens, as well as the bias towards exporting firms. All in all, these samples are deemed 
to be reasonably similar. 
Table 3 shows the detailed sector distribution and percentage of firms with positive 
R&D spending in 25 sectors of activities in all the 3 samples. Finally, Table 4 shows the 
regional distribution of observations across the 3 samples. Overall, the sector and regional 
distribution of firms is reasonably similar across samples, while there are more differences 
in the share of firms with positive R&D spending both across industries and across regions. 
                                                                          
14. Note that during the period of analysis some firms moved across sectors, regions, sizes, etc. More concretely, 
referring to the extended sample of 2,565 firms, about 7% of them changed at least once of sector of activity (2% more 
than once), 0.6% changed of region and 25% varied of size at least once (defined broadly as SMEs or large firms). We 
decided to keep those firms in the sample and assign to each of them every year their corresponding sector, size, etc. 
Lastly, about 20% of the firms in the extended sample have gone through at least one change in ownership, due to 
mergers or divisions. We have marked those firms and kept them in the sample only if we could follow them after 
the change. 
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4 Empirical strategy 
4.1 Methodology 
We model the decision to innovate as a dynamic discrete choice panel data model. The 
dynamic framework would be justified by the existence of sunk costs15 [Sutton (1991)], 
the hypothesis of “success breeds success” [Mansfield (1968)] and the hypothesis that 
innovation involves dynamic increasing returns [Nelson and Winter (1982)].16 Although 
the purpose of our paper is not to study the presence of persistence per se in the 
decision to innovate, it is interesting to note that the latter hypothesis states that dynamic 
increasing returns in the form of learning-by-doing enhance the knowledge stocks and, 
therefore, the probability of future innovations. Since a firm’s absorptive capacity is likewise 
a function of the stock of knowledge, learning in one period will allow for a more efficient 
accumulation of external knowledge in subsequent periods [Cohen and Levinthal (1989)]. 
Hence, the cumulative nature of knowledge should also induce state dependence in 
innovation behaviour. Therefore, in order to test for the relevance of a firm’s absorptive 
capacity in the decision to innovate, one has to account for the state dependence, so that 
the estimated coefficient does not reflect such persistence. 
The econometric specification is written as: 
 
(1) 
where t=1,…,T and i=1,…,N. Also, 1(…) is the usual indicator function and it is assumed that 
the time-variant error term uit/ yi0, yi1,…, yit-1, xi aiid N(0,1) and that uit A Ki where xi =(xi1,…, xiT). 
Equation (1) models the decision of firm i to innovate as a function of its past 
innovative behaviour (yit-1), some observable determinants (xit), unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity (Ki) and other time-variant unobserved components uncorrelated with xit.17 
For estimation purposes we will have to tackle three important theoretical 
and practical problems: First, the treatment of the unobserved heterogeneity Ki, secondly, 
the handling of the initial condition yi0, and thirdly, the possibility that some of the regressors in 
xit are not strictly exogenous. As regards the first two problems, we follow Wooldridge (2005) 
in our estimation strategy. Therefore, we employ a correlated random effects framework 
à la Chamberlain (1980) whereby we model the distribution of the unobserved effect 
conditional on the initial value and any explanatory variables in order to partial it out from the 
likelihood function. A priori, a fixed effects estimator would seem to be preferable, since it 
does not make any assumptions about the distribution of Ki. However, we are interested 
                                                                          
15. Máñez et al. (2009) use a panel for Spanish manufacturing firms to show that prior R&D experience matters in the 
current decision to invest in R&D, which is consistent with the existence of sunk costs. This study has some variables 
in common with ours, such as an index of labour quality, which has a expected positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. 
16. See Máñez-Castillejo et al. (2004) and Peters (2005), and the references cited therein, for a thorough revision of all 
this literature. 
17. We will relax this assumption below. The list of potential endogenous variables contains human capital variables, 
such as the share of skilled workers, financial variables (equity share, debt-assets ratio, share of banking debt) or market 
concentration variables. 
)0'(1 11 !  itiititit uxyy KGD
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in the magnitudes of the partial effects, which depend not only on the covariates xit but also 
on the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity —more on this below. The correlated 
random effects framework allows us to avoid the uneasy RE assumption of independence 
between xit and Ki, but at the same time allowing for some correlation. Further, following 
Wooldridge (2005), you can conveniently specify a distribution of Ki that suits you well from a 
computational perspective. 
Concerning the second problem, you have to decide how to treat the initial 
condition, since the joint density of (yi1,…, yiT) given (yi0, xi, Ki) is 
 
(2) 
which depends on yi0 when t=1. Wooldridge (2005) suggests to model the distribution of Ki 
conditional on yi0 and xi, which allows to integrate out Ki and leads to the joint density 
of (yi1,…, yiT) given (yi0, xi). Then, MLE conditional on (yi0, xi) can be used, which can be 
computationally simple. In order to follow this strategy, we assume that the firm-specific 
heterogeneity depends on the initial condition and the strictly exogenous variables in the 
following way: 
 
(3) 
where it is further assumed that ai aiid N(0,V2a) and that ai A (yi0, xi0), and thus: 
 
(4) 
Hence, the probability of being an innovator is given by: 
 
(5) 
which yields a likelihood function that has the same structure as in the standard RE panel 
data probit model. 
It has to be noted, though, that Wooldridge (2005) suggested using either the time 
averages18 of xit or the whole vector xi=(xi1,…, xiT) in order to model the distribution of 
the individual heterogeneity, as put forward by Chamberlain (1980). However, given that this 
estimator requires a balanced panel, which limits the number of observations, and that we are 
potentially dealing with some endogenous covariates, we opted to include the initial value of 
the explanatory variables xi0 instead. This way, we reduce the number of explanatory variables 
and, at the same time, avoid estimation biases, since if some variables in xit are not strictly 
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exogenous, then some of the elements in °txit or in xi would be correlated with the error 
term uit. Moreover, much of the information contained in either °txit or in xi is embedded in xi0 
since there exists a relatively high degree of persistence in most of these variables. 
As regards the third problem, endogeneity is tackled in two ways: playing with the 
lags between the decision to innovate and the outcomes of that decision, and using control 
function methods à la Rivers-Vuong and Blundell-Smith, as in Papke and Wooldridge (2008). 
Firstly, and in line with most of the empirical literature on innovation, we will estimate our 
empirical specifications including all covariates lagged one period. The rationale for this is the 
following: at the beginning of time t, when managers gather to decide whether to undertake 
innovative activities or not, their information set contains the explanatory variables up to t-1. 
Some of these variables are exogenous to their decision to innovate, such as the sector 
capital intensity or the stock of public knowledge available in a particular region, while others 
are not. The latter —indeed, most of the variables in our study— can be regarded as 
predetermined, since they reflect choices made in the past and are not affected by future 
decisions about innovation. For instance, the growth rate of real sales would reflect the 
innovative effort made in the recent past in order to improve the quality of a firm’s products, 
but, a priori, there are no particular reasons to expect that current sales reflect the expected 
decision to innovate in, say, three years time. 
However, there are some regressors that may be potentially endogenous to the 
decision to innovate. Some of them have already been identified, such as financial variables 
(equity share, debt-assets ratio, share of banking debt) or market concentration variables, 
while others have received less attention in the literature on innovation, such as the share of 
skilled-labour or of temporary workers. As regards market structure variables, in our short 
sample (2003-2007), market conditions are unlikely to change much in response to firms’ 
innovative activities, so endogeneity would not be an issue. Moreover, since the focus of 
this paper is not on financial issues, we will not pay a particular attention to the endogeneity 
of the financial ratios. Hence, we will try to deal carefully with the simultaneity of human capital 
variables. 
There are several reasons to expect the share of qualified personnel to be related to 
technological factors. Indeed, according to the theories that emphasize the role of skill-biased 
technological change, the share of skilled-labour would be determined by the technological 
content of the productive process and, hence, endogenous to the decision to innovate. 
Additionally, this share in period t would reflect innovative choices made in periods t,t-1,t-2,… 
but, also, it would be reasonable to expect it to depend on technological choices expected 
in t+1,t+2,…,t+k. Similar arguments can be made for the portion of fixed-term employees or 
for training expenditures. 
As a consequence, we will deal with endogeneity as in Papke and Wooldridge 
(2008), who present an attractive framework to estimate nonlinear panel data models where 
endogeneity might be an issue in the spirit of Rivers and Vuong (1988). In order to do this, 
let us express our structural model as: 
(6) 
where the vector wit contains the potentially endogenous variables, that can be correlated 
with uit, and the exogenous variables are zit=(z1it, z2it), where we need some time-varying, 
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strictly exogenous variables z2it to be excluded from (6). We also model the unobserved 
heterogeneity as in (3): 
 (7) 
where ai/zi aN(0,V2a). Equation (7) can be plugged into (6) to arrive to a similar expression 
as (5). Next, we have to assume a linear reduced form for the endogenous variables, wit:19 
(8) 
where, if necessary, we can allow the coefficients in (8) to depend on t. The addition of yi0 and 
zi0 follows from the Chamberlain (1980)’s correlated RE device, as in equation (3). The nature 
of endogeneity of wit is through the correlation between uit  and vit, the reduced form error. 
If it is further assumed that uit =Ovit+eit, where eit/(zi, vit)aN(0,V2e), then it can be shown that 
the structural model has the following form: 
(9) 
where the subscript “e” denotes division by (1+V2e)1/2. This equation is the basis for 
estimation. Papke and Wooldridge (2008) propose a simple two-step estimation procedure 
for the scaled coefficients which consists of 1) estimating the reduced form for wit and 
obtaining the residuals vˆ it for all (i,t) pairs, and 2) estimating the probit of yit on yit-1, wit, z1it, yi0, 
z1i0, vˆ it to estimate the scaled coefficients. They also suggest using two-step pooled 
methods, because they are very computationally attractive. To be more specific, we will use a 
pooled probit for the first stage and a pooled probit QMLE for the second stage. Moreover, 
due to the two-step nature of the procedure, the standard errors in the second stage have 
to be adjusted for the first stage estimation. We will use bootstrap methods in our empirical 
exercise. Further, it has to be noted that a test of endogeneity of wit is easily obtained as an 
asymptotic t statistic on vˆ it. 
4.2 Variables 
4.2.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
We will define an innovative company as a firm that exhibits positive R&D expenditures 
in a given year.20 This choice is determined by the fact that this is the only available 
proxy for innovation we have at our disposal in the Central de Balances database. It implies 
that we analyze the role of absorptive capacity variables from the point of view of innovation 
inputs, which might be different than that for the behaviour of innovation outputs. 
Given the tight link found in the literature between inputs and outputs in the innovation 
process [see Crépon et al. (1998)], we believe that this distinction is not so relevant. 
This notwithstanding, as we are aware that this choice may be somehow problematic, we will 
use two additional proxies for innovative activities —more on this below— which result from 
                                                                          
19. In this exposition, we assume, for simplicity, that we have a single endogenous explanatory variable. 
20. See Table 5 for a description of all the variables used in the estimation exercise. 
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matching our database with the PITEC database. The first alternative dependent variable is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one when a firm has positive innovation 
expenditures in the corresponding year —which are a broader measure that encompasses 
R&D outlays—. The second one, which is more outcome-oriented, is a dummy variable 
that equals one whenever a company declares to be involved in an innovative project that 
has not been finalized yet or has been abandoned as of date t. 
As it can be seen in Table 6, which shows transition probabilities for our main dependent 
variables, the innovation behaviour is highly persistent at the firm level, both in the larger 
(unbalanced) sample and in the constrained (balanced) sample. In both samples about 89% 
of innovating firms in one period continued to be innovative in the subsequent period, 
while 11% ceased to be innovators. Similarly, around 97% of non-innovative firms maintained 
this status in the following period, while just 3% of them became innovative firms. In other 
words, the likelihood of being innovative in period t+1 was nearly 87 percentage points higher 
for innovators than for non-innovators. Finally, the transition probabilities for (positive) 
innovation expenditures are quite similar than those for R&D expenditures. 
4.2.2 SPILLOVERS AND THE ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF A FIRM 
As we have emphasized in the second section, the literature on R&D has stressed the role of 
knowledge spillovers in the decision to invest [Griliches (1992)]. Spillovers may be understood 
as knowledge borrowed by research teams in one firm from the ideas generated by other 
firms in either the same industry or in a different sector, even across regions or countries. 
In this vein, and with the purpose of analyzing the relevance of different types of spillovers, 
we have built several measures of spillovers using aggregate data at both the sector and 
regional level. We have computed the stock of business R&D capital —using the perpetual 
inventory method— for each of the different industries at the national level and for each 
region irrespective of the industry,21 so that we can study whether it is more relevant the stock 
of knowledge capital at a regional level or at an industry level. Moreover, we have also 
calculated the stock of public R&D capital by region22 —there was no sector disaggregation 
for this variable—. Further, another way to take into account these spillovers is that suggested 
by Máñez-Castillejo et al. (2004). Region-specific spillovers are captured by the fraction of 
firms that perform R&D activities in the same region, irrespectively of the corresponding 
two-digit industry. Industry-specific spillovers are the fraction of firms that perform R&D 
activities in the same industry, be they in the same region or not. 
However, we have argued in Section 2 that, in order to take advantage of these spillovers, 
firms have to develop their own research skills. Thus, in line with some of the literature, such 
as Griffith et al. (2003 and 2004), Jaffe (1986) or Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2004), we 
proxy a firm’s absorptive capacity in our baseline specification with its R&D intensity, 
measured as R&D spending over total sales.23 However, following the seminal paper of 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) we have also tried a specification where the absorptive capacity 
depends on the firm’s R&D capital stock, rather than the flow. Additionally, we will also 
study the role of some human capital variables in the decision to innovate, both their 
direct impact and indirect one, which we will link to absorptive capacity. More concretely, 
                                                                          
21. See Table 5 for a description and Table 7 for some summary statistics. 
22. This includes R&D spending of both high education institutions and public administration. 
23. There might be some objections to the use of lagged R&D intensity as a regressor, since the dependent variable is 
also a function of R&D expenditures. Note, however, that we already take into account the role of state dependence, 
i.e., we include the lagged dependent variable and the initial condition in the regressions. Thus, the impact of R&D 
intensity goes beyond capturing state dependence, and we link that impact to firms’ absorptive capacity. 
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we consider the skill composition of a firm’s labour force and provision of on-the-job training 
(measured as the share of managers, professionals and technicians in total employment 
and real training expenditures per employee respectively), and some measures of job 
instability —the share of temporary employees—. 
 4.2.3 OTHER CONTROLS 
The empirical literature traditionally distinguishes several groups of variables that 
determine the decision to innovate, besides those related to the existence of spillovers and 
firms’ absorptive capacity. The incentive to invest in R&D depends on the economic 
and technological opportunities faced by the firm, on appropriability conditions, on market 
characteristics, on the business cycle and other macroeconomic factors and, finally, on other 
unclassified determinants. As regards the economic opportunities [Schmookler (1962)], 
these are determined by factors such as the expected future demand, the size and growth 
of the market and the willingness of society to pay for new or improved products. To proxy 
for these things we consider the growth rate of firms’ sales, in order to account for firm- and 
sector-specific demand shocks,24 and time dummies, to capture macro-level changes, such 
as the business cycle. 
Another group of variables influencing the decision to innovate relates to 
technological opportunities. The usual way to proxy for this, which we follow, is to employ 
two-digit industry dummies. Also, it has been argued that technological opportunities 
decrease with the life cycle of the firm’s product [Cohen, Levin and Mowery (1987)], since 
newly born firms are typically very innovative [Huergo and Jaumandreu (2002)]. There should 
be, then, an inverse relationship between age and the propensity to innovate at the industry 
level. In order to control for this, we include the variable age measured as the difference 
between the current year and the year of foundation reported by the firm. 
Appropriability conditions are also a main determinant of the decision to undertake 
innovative activities. The literature has found two opposing effects of low levels of 
appropriability on R&D investment. On the one hand, there is the traditional disincentive effect 
because of the difficulties to appropriate the benefits of a firm’s own investments 
[Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962)]. On the other hand, when appropriability is low, 
spillovers among firms are higher and, in order to profit from them, firms may need to 
invest in R&D with the purpose of developing sufficient absorptive capacity [Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989)]. To control for appropriability conditions we introduce the total number of 
patents granted in the same region where the firm operates, which is a variable that is 
calculated using data for the whole economy disaggregated by region from the National 
Statistics Institute.25 
Market characteristics, such as the degree of market concentration and competition, 
have an important role in the decision to innovate. The degree of market power has 
traditionally been highlighted as a crucial determinant of innovation [Schumpeter (1942) and 
Arrow (1962)], since it allows firms to prevent imitation and, thus, appropriate returns from 
innovation. Moreover, increased monopolistic power means higher price-to-cost margins, 
which enhances the financing of innovative activities via higher profits. Additionally, as far 
                                                                          
24. We also included the growth rate of industry sales, but it turned out to be non significant, so it was removed. 
25. We would have liked to build an industry-level measure, such as the one used by Beneito (2003), which is the ratio 
between the total number of patents granted and the total number of firms that assert to have achieved innovations in 
the firm’s industrial sector. However, we cannot build the same proxy, since we do not have the number of patents 
granted to the firms in our database. 
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back as Scherer (1967) it was established the potential existence of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between competition and innovation. On the one hand, innovation should decline 
with competition, as more competition reduces the monopoly rents that reward successful 
innovators. On the other hand, firms have to innovate in order to stay in business owing 
to competitive pressures, particularly in industries with a higher degree of neck-and-neckness 
[see Aghion et al. (2005)]. Therefore, the incentives to innovate increase with moderate 
amounts of competition, where the escape-competition effect predominates, and then 
fall due to the excess competition and the Schumpeterian effect of reduced appropriability 
of profits. In order to account for this, several indicators of market power were computed: 
two measures of concentration, the concentration ratio of the three largest firms in the 
relevant market and the market share of the 10% largest firms, a proxy for the price-to-cost 
margin26 and the Herfindahl index —which is computed for the employment share using data 
from the DIRCE, which is a database that registers basic information about the population 
of all firms—, and finally, the (in-sample) market share of each firm. Although Artés (2008) 
shows the importance for innovation of using several indicators of competition in his study of 
the Spanish manufacturing sector, we will see that none of these variables turned out to be 
significant in our regressions. Another important issue regarding market power is the threat 
posed by potential competition from entrants. Barriers to entry can both weaken or favour 
the incentives for innovation. The Schumpeterian view expects a positive effect from barriers 
to entry, while others argue that they reduce the stimulus to introduce new products. 
Barriers to entry can be proxied by the average capital intensity of the industry [Kraft (1989)]. 
In our case, we calculate the (in-sample) industry average of plant and equipment assets 
per worker. 
It is a commonly held view that innovation activities are difficult to finance in a 
competitive market setting with capital from sources external to the firm. In other words, there 
exists a gap between the rate of return required by the entrepreneur investing his own funds 
and that required by external investors [Arrow (1962)]. Therefore, unless the innovative firm is 
already profitable, some innovations will fail to materialize only because of too high a cost of 
external capital. Hall (2002) provides an excellent review of both the theoretical and empirical 
literature on internal finance and R&D, so we are not going to survey these questions in 
depth. She highlights some features of this type of investment27 that imply that debt or equity 
finance will be relatively more expensive for R&D than for ordinary investment, which suggests 
an important role for retained earnings —cash flow— in the decision to innovate, as has been 
shown by the pioneer works of Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994). 
Hence, we are going to introduce some measures of financial constraints in our 
empirical exercise. The first is the ratio of equity to liabilities, as a measure of the relevance 
of cash flows and retained earnings on the decision to innovate. The second is the share of 
short-term liabilities to total liabilities, as a measure of financial vulnerability, since these 
liabilities must be refinanced each year out of current cash flows and R&D projects 
usually lack a regular stream of cash flows. And the third one is the share of bank loans on 
                                                                          
26. Computed as (gross operating surplus – financial expenditures)/sales. 
27. First of all, R&D investment –the main innovative activity– has a high degree of uncertainty associated with its output, 
which tends to be greatest at the beginning of the research project. Research programs usually have small probabilities 
of great success in the future, so that the asymmetric information problem is enhanced. Investors have more difficulty 
distinguishing good projects from bad and, thus, charge a higher risk premium for financing. Moreover, the information 
asymmetry cannot be reduced through greater transparency, because firms are reluctant to reveal their innovative ideas 
for fear of being imitated. Second, the knowledge asset created by R&D investment is intangible, partly embedded in 
human capital and usually very firm-specific, whereas creditors prefer to use tangible assets as collateral for their loans. 
Third, R&D programs are characterized by an uncertain and unstable stream of cash flows, which undermines debt 
financing, since servicing this debt requires a stable source of cash flows. 
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total liabilities. This latter variable is crucial in the Spanish case, since it has a bank-dominated 
financial system. 
Indeed, a number of recent papers have stressed the role played by bank finance in 
fostering or hampering innovation. The development of financial intermediaries may help 
reduce the cost of acquiring information and allow a better assessment, selection and 
monitoring of R&D projects. Another channel that is particularly relevant in the Spanish 
economy is through bank competition and the expansion in the supply of credit that it brings. 
The period under study, 2003-2007, has witnessed a substantial increase in bank credit in 
a context of lax financial conditions which has flowed to most sectors of activity, although 
particularly so to the housing sector, which may have crowded-out credit flows to 
other sectors, for instance, the research sector. However, other authors argue that 
relationship-based bank financing discourages new technologies because bank officers 
are unable to evaluate them. Overall, the empirical literature tends to find a positive effect of 
bank financing on innovation, although there are some exceptions.28 
Finally, a number of firm characteristics have also been stressed by the literature 
as important determinants of the propensity to innovate. Firm’s size:29 innovations are so 
expensive that only large firms can support them, due to the existence of fixed (sunk) costs 
or economies of scale that allow to spread the cost of R&D between more units of output 
(this is what Cohen and Klepper call “cost spreading” and applies not only to firm’s size but to 
the size of the market as well). In addition, large firms can undertake more innovation projects 
of the same magnitude than small firms so that they can pool the risks and reduce aggregate 
risk [Kraft (1989)]. Firm size is measured by the (log) number of employees, as in most of the 
literature. 
Further, the degree of international competition is measured by the penetration of 
imports in the industry where the firm operates, while the degree of internationalization is 
proxied by a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the firm reports positive export 
earnings. Indeed, firms operating in international markets are exposed to different competitive 
settings which, among other things, could be the source of new ideas leading to innovation 
[see Cassiman and Martínez-Ros (2005) for the Spanish case). Moreover, some authors 
have stressed that foreign owned firms are less likely to engage in innovative activities. 
One potential reason is the fact that R&D activities play a crucial role in the long term 
strategy of a company and managers wish to keep direct control over such activities, 
thus R&D activities are usually located close to the companies’ headquarters [Bishop and 
Wiseman (1999)]. We control for this factor with a dummy variable that equals one when a 
foreign company has a positive share in a firm’s equity. Additionally, we account for the fact 
that the company may receive funding from the public sector in the form of subsidies to fixed 
capital. This is justified by the fact that, to the extent that fixed capital and knowledge capital 
are complementary inputs in the productive process, then subsidizing physical assets could 
have a positive impact on the accumulation of knowledge capital. 
                                                                          
28. Benfratello et al. (2008), Herrera and Minetti (2007) and Huynh and Rotondi (2007), using similar data for the Italian 
economy, find evidence in favour of a positive effect of bank financing, in particular, for innovative activities of firms in 
high-tech sectors, that depend more on external finance and that have a lengthy credit relationship. Additionally, some of 
the results suggest that relationship-based lending has a benefit on innovation not by fostering R&D, but by channelling 
funds for the introduction of new technologies. On the contrary, Atanassov et al. (2007), using a large panel of US 
companies, find that firms relying more on arms’ length financing (equity and debt) have a larger number of patents. 
29. For a thorough study on the relationship of size and R&D see Cohen and Klepper (1996). 
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Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation 
exercise. It turned out that for almost all variables the variation across firms (between 
variation) is higher than the variation within firms over time. Further, 25% of the observations 
correspond to innovative firms. 
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5 Econometric results 
5.1.  Main results 
Table 8 reports the estimation results for the dynamic RE probit model using a balanced 
panel for the period 2003-2007. In addition, we compare our results with the static 
pooled and RE models, as well as with a dynamic RE model which only controls for the 
initial condition. Moreover, the static models are estimated for the whole sample (1991-2007) 
in order to check whether the results are very sensitive to the estimation period —which they 
are not, see below. 
The first result that is worth remarking is the fact that the lagged dependent variable 
is a relevant determinant of the decision to innovate. Even after accounting for individual 
unobserved heterogeneity, past innovative experience is highly significant, thus confirming the 
existence of true state dependence. The results further show that the initial condition is also 
highly significant, which, in our estimation framework, implies that there is a substantial 
correlation between firms’ “pre-sample” innovation status and firm-specific heterogeneity. 
Moreover, the statistical significance of several variables tends to weaken, or even disappear, 
when we go from the static to the dynamic specifications —see export status, share of skilled 
labour, the equity ratio and the share of banking liabilities—. There are two interpretations to 
this result. The first one would point to the fact that some of these variables, which are 
themselves highly persistent, might be picking up the impact of the lagged dependent 
variable in the static regressions. The second explanation is related to the way we model the 
unobserved heterogeneity. Given the short time span considered in the estimation exercise 
and the somewhat high persistence of some of these variables, including the covariates in t=0 
might be detracting statistical significance from those variables. 
It is also worth remarking that the results provide evidence that firm-specific 
heterogeneity is a key factor for innovation persistence. The importance of this variable in 
explaining the variance of the likelihood of innovation can be gauged from the statistic U, 
which measures the share of the variance of the dependent variable explained by unobserved 
heterogeneity.30 In the static models, that share amounts to over 80% of the variation in the 
dependent variable, while in the dynamic models there is a marked reduction to between 
12% and 18%. Moreover, it has to be highlighted that the Wald test on the joint significance 
of the explanatory variables in t=0, which were included to account for the correlated RE 
framework, fails to reject that they are not statistically significant (see the Wald-Heterogeneity 
line under the final column). Additionally, the LR test on the null hypothesis that U=0 also 
failed to be rejected, which is somehow counterintuitive. The results of these two tests are 
features that hold for all the estimates that we are going to present; therefore we opted to 
consider the specification where we model firm-specific heterogeneity as: 
 
(10) 
                                                                          
30. In other words, U=Va2/(1+Va2). 
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as our baseline specification (fifth column in Table 8), in contrast to equation (3).31 The results 
are quite similar in this case than when we model Ki as in (3), except for a slight decrease 
in the statistical significant of some variables. These estimates are available upon request. 
However, the most important finding is that in addition to past innovation experience, 
the existence of spillovers coming from the stock of “sector” knowledge generated by other 
firms and the firm’s capacity to assimilate that knowledge, as measured by the R&D intensity, 
are related to the decision to innovate. The stock of knowledge generated in the same 
sector of activity of a firm (k priv-sec) has a positive impact on its probability to innovate; 
however, this effect is enhanced when we account for the firm’s absorptive capacity, proxied 
by the ratio of R&D expenditure over sales (k priv-sec*R&D intensity). Indeed, if we compute 
the average partial effect32 for these two variables (more on this below, in section 5.2), then 
we have a coefficient of 0.023 for the stock of knowledge capital and of 0.113 for its 
interaction with the R&D intensity. In other words, the marginal impact of knowledge spillovers 
on the probability of innovation would increase six-fold, from 0.023 to 0.136, for a firm that 
raises its R&D-to-sales ratio from 0% to 1%, which is substantial. 
 Moreover, the coefficients of human capital variables, such as the share of skilled 
workers and the share of temporary workers, are also significant. That is, firms with a higher 
share of skilled workers have a larger probability of doing R&D activities, while those which 
have a greater portion of temporary workers tend to have a lower propensity to innovate. 
On the other hand, the coefficient for training expenditures is less precisely estimated, 
although overall tends to be positive, and statistically significant for the whole sample in 
static models. All in all, these results highlight the important role of spillovers, the absorptive 
capacity and human capital variables in the dynamics of firms’ innovation behaviour. 
There are some additional firm characteristics that are found as well to be relevant 
in explaining the innovation decision. As regards financial factors, firms that have a larger 
share of short term liabilities are less likely to invest in R&D, since they are more likely 
to be financially constrained. Moreover, the presence of bank financing seems to be beneficial 
for innovation, thus confirming the hypothesis that commercial banking ameliorates the 
monitoring problem of capital markets. In other words, financial intermediaries help reduce 
the cost of acquiring information and allows a better assessment, selection and monitoring 
of R&D projects. Finally, firms with a higher share of equity, i.e. with more internal resources, 
are more likely to engage in R&D activities, as expected. 
Furthermore, the proxy for appropriability conditions —the number of patents per 
region— has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, which suggests that the larger 
the appropriability, the lower the incentives to innovate, since firms cannot easily profit from 
spillovers. Besides, firms that received public funding for capital expenditures (capital grants) 
in the previous period exhibit a higher propensity to innovate in the subsequent period than 
firms without such financial support. Likewise, we find that exporting firms tend to have a 
higher probability of being innovative, as expected. Shocks to firms’ demand, as proxied 
by the growth rate of sales, and firm size have a positive impact on innovation, as found in 
previous papers. 
                                                                          
31. An additional advantage is that we conserve on degrees of freedom as we avoid overparameterization. 
32. Notice that in order to compute the average partial effect one has to multiply the scale factor (see the “scale factor 
for APE” at the bottom of the table) by the estimated coefficient. This also allows comparing the results from the different 
methods of estimation, which are not directly comparable due to different normalizations. 
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However, and contrary to most literature, we do not find any significant impact of 
market structure variables on the decision to innovate. This result would be consistent with 
the idea that, in general, changes in the market structure of an industry take time to 
materialize and, since we are working with a five-year sample, it is difficult to capture their 
effect on firms’ decisions. This might also be due to the fact that we have used bad proxies 
to account for market structure factors. Yet, besides using the firm’s market share, the 
degree of import penetration and the measure of concentration based on the market share 
of the 10% largest firms, we have checked for the robustness of our results including the 
price-to-cost markup and two other measures of concentration, one based on the market 
share of the 3 largest firms and another one based on the Herfindahl index. This last variable 
has been built using data on employment from the DIRCE, which is closer to the “desired” 
population. These variables turned out to be non significant either and did not alter the main 
thrust of our results. 
Another sensitivity analysis that we implement is to compare our baseline results with 
those coming from estimating our model for the whole sample, in order to check the stability 
of our results, both across time and across firms, since we are working with a sub-sample. 
Since the dynamic methods require balanced panels, we only estimate static pooled and RE 
probits (see columns 2 and 4 in Table 8).33 Now, we have 2,500 firms and 16,590 
observations. Overall, there are not many significant differences in the estimation results, 
which underpins the robustness of our empirical exercise. We would highlight, however, 
that, in the whole sample training expenditures turn out to be a statistically significant driver 
of innovation —as we already mentioned above—, while the degree of import penetration 
negatively affects the decision to invest in R&D. 
Given our focus on human capital variables as catalysts of innovative activities within 
firms, we present in Table 9 the results of an exercise that accounts for the role of those 
variables as enhancers of firms’ absorptive capacity. In other words, we try to disentangle 
whether the impact of human capital variables comes from their ability to improve firms’ 
absorptive capacity or from other factors. In order to do this, we replace the interaction 
between “k priv-sec” and “R&D intensity” with the interaction between “k priv-sec” and a 
human capital variable, one at a time.34 In the second column it can be seen that, on the one 
hand, skilled workers tend to improve firms’ capability to absorb spillovers and, thus, 
encourage innovation, but on the other, skilled labour per se tends to diminish the probability 
of innovation. This last result, though counterintuitive at first, could be rationalized as in 
Kraft (1989). He argues that this kind of workers is mostly employed to fulfil administrative 
tasks (e.g. accounting, marketing, finance, etc). Hence, a high percentage of skilled-workers 
can indicate that a firm has a bureaucratic structure, which impedes innovative activity. 
In fact this is what he finds in his empirical exercise.35 In short, we provide some evidence 
that the positive sign attached to this variable in the baseline equations may be due to the 
fact that it is accounting for an enhanced absorptive capacity rather than better qualifications 
of the workforce. 
                                                                          
33. We have to do away with the stock of private sector knowledge capital and its interaction with R&D intensity 
because we cannot compute these variables for the whole sample due to lack of data. 
34. We run a regression including the interaction of “k priv-sec” with all human capital variables at once and the results 
were similar. This is available upon request. 
35. Additionally, Romijn and Albalejo (2002) find that the share of technicians in a firm’s labour force decreases its 
probability of innovation while the percentage of engineers increases it. They argue that this result reflects the fact that 
only specialized knowledge and experience in science and engineering, rather than practical intermediate-level skills, 
are important for innovation. In our exercise we are not able to distinguish between engineers and technicians, which 
could explain the lack of robustness of the coefficient of skilled labour. 
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The amount of resources devoted to training is also positively and statistically 
significantly related to the decision to innovate through its impact on the firm’s absorptive 
capacity, while the parameter for this variable alone would be positive but non-significant. 
On the contrary, the share of fixed-term employment does not seem to hamper the 
absorption of external spillovers and, thus, innovative activities, since the coefficient is 
negative, but statistically insignificant. Its impact on these activities would come from other 
channels, such as less motivation or less acquisition of specific human capital, as suggested 
by Albert et al. (2004) for the Spanish case. The rest of the results are, overall, quite similar 
qualitatively, although quantitatively the coefficients are less precisely estimated. 
5.2 Magnitude of the effects  
In this section we provide some estimates of the increase in the probability of undertaking 
innovative activities that can be expected from a change in the main variables in our study. 
We believe that this computation is interesting so as to illustrate the orders of magnitude we 
are talking about, even though there are some doubts about the endogeneity of some 
relevant variables (see next section), which would hamper the reliability of the estimated partial 
effects. In order to do this, we firstly compute the partial effects of these variables. Given that 
they depend on firm-specific heterogeneity, we can compute the partial effects at the average 
(PEA), which are the partial effects for the average individual in the sample. However, this has 
the drawback that usually the average value is not representative of a large share of the firms. 
Therefore, it is preferable to estimate the average partial effect (APE), which is the average of 
all individual partial effects across time in the sample.36 
Table 10 contains the results of these estimates for our baseline regression 
(fifth column, Table 8). The first column shows the average value of the variables taken into 
consideration, while in the second column we provide the assumed change in the concerned 
variable, which will be, for simplicity, 10%, and in the third column we include the APE for our 
baseline specification. The final column calculates the estimated change in the probability of 
innovation for each variable. The first effect that we consider is the direct effect of undertaking 
innovative activities on the subsequent probability of being an innovator. This can be regarded 
as a sort of intertemporal effect that arises as a consequence of the strong state dependence 
of this type of activities. The partial effects, thus, provide the change in innovative status 
between t and t+1, from non-innovator to innovator. In other words, it computes 
P(yit=1/ yit-1=1,xi,Ki)-P(yit=1/ yit-1=0,xi,Ki) averaged out across firms and time. As we can 
see in the table, controlling for differences in observed and unobserved characteristics, 
the propensity to innovate in period t is approximately 47 percentage points higher for 
innovators than for non-innovators in period t-1. This contrasts with the transition probabilities 
calculated in Section 4.1, which showed that the change in the propensity to innovate 
between the two types of firms was close to 87 percentage points.37 
Moreover, we also compute the “double face” effect of R&D investment, which is 
an indirect effect related to its role as enhancer of absorptive capacity. In this case, for an 
assumed 10% increase in R&D intensity, we estimate that the probability of reporting positive 
R&D investment would increase by about 1 percentage point, which represents around 4% of 
the actual frequency of conducting R&D (25% is the sample mean), which is a non-negligible 
figure. As regards the human capital variables, we may see that the one with the greatest 
direct impact is the share of temporary employment, with a partial effect of -0.069. The share 
                                                                          
36. See Annex A and Wooldridge (2002 and 2005) for a deeper analysis of these issues. 
37. Peters (2005), using a similar methodology, estimates a difference of between 23 and 36 percentage points for 
German manufacturing firms and of between 8 and 13 for services firms. 
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of skilled workers also has a relatively high impact, while training expenditures have a 
small one. The partial effects of financial variables are quite similar across them and, 
for a 10% change, they imply variations in the propensity to innovate in the order of 
between 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points, a similar impact than that from the stock of sector 
knowledge capital. 
In sum, it is clear that the main factor affecting the propensity to innovate is the 
presence of true state dependence. Nevertheless, the impact of the double role of R&D 
investment is also significant, and that from other factors, such as human capital variables 
or financial variables, is smaller, though non-negligible. 
5.3 Endogeneity 
 In this section we empirically analyze the potential endogeneity of human capital variables. 
Firstly, in order to do this, we have to find some instrumental variables that must satisfy 
two conditions: i) they must be uncorrelated with the unobservable time-varying error term uit, 
and ii) they must be sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variables that we want to 
instrument.38 This is a difficult task in our particular context, since most variables at the firm 
level that can be correlated with the human resource management variables might be 
deemed to be, at the same time, jointly determined with the decision to innovate. Hence, 
given the difficulty of exploiting firm-level variation in order to identify the parameters of 
interest, we have searched for instruments outside our sample, trying to exploit the regional 
variation39 of some interesting variables. 
The first such variable —see Table 5 for definitions and sources— is the share of 
immigrants in total population by province, which is a determinant of the potential labour 
supply of temporary workers, since they are more prone to work in any type of job. At the 
same time, since it has been documented that they have a lower educational level, this share 
would be negatively correlated with the availability of skilled labour. Moreover, given their 
lower education and their different cultural background one would expect these people to be 
somehow more eligible to receive on-the-job training, so that this variable would be positively 
correlated with training expenditures. Additionally, we have used the unemployment rate by 
province as an instrument. The larger the unemployment rate, the more willing a person is to 
accept a fixed-term contract. At the same time, one could argue that a higher unemployment 
rate could result in a depreciation of human capital, as long term unemployment begins to rise 
and this, in turn, results in a deterioration of the skills of the unemployed. Hence, this would 
affect negatively the supply of skilled labour. Another relevant determinant of this supply is the 
share of people with higher education, by province. Besides, these people are less prone to 
end up with a temporary employment and one would expect them to be more likely to receive 
on-the-job training. 
Further, we have built a dummy variable that equals one when a firm has signed 
a firm-level collective bargaining agreement. One would expect that in firms with this type of 
agreement —where the influence of trade unions on management practices is arguably 
higher— the prevalence of fixed-term contracts is lower than in the other firms, since trade 
unions tend to oppose them. Also, it is likely that trade unions in these firms tend to favour 
on-the-job training programs, so a positive correlation between this dummy and the training 
                                                                          
38. There is another requirement, the order condition, which ensures that there is at least one instrumental variable 
for each endogenous regressor in order to identify the parameter of interest. 
39. Spanish regions (Comunidades Autónomas) are divided into provinces. We use both regional and provincial 
variation. 
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expenditures would be expected. Finally, we have used as an instrument the share of women, 
between 15 and 64 years old, in the population of the province. To the extent that women 
tend to be better qualified, as measured by the number of years of formal education, they 
increase the potential supply of skilled-labour.40 
As described in section 4.1, in the first stage we have regressed the human capital 
variables on all exogenous regressors and on all instrumental variables using a pooled probit 
with a fully robust variance matrix. Then we have tested whether the latter variables are jointly 
statistically significant. Indeed, in the case of skilled labour, the robust Wald test gives a 
p-value of 0.001, although individually only the coefficients for the share of women and the 
unemployment rate are significant.41 As regards fixed-term employees, the Wald test gives a 
zero p-value to three decimal places. In this case, the share of immigrants, the unemployment 
rate and the firm-level collective agreement dummy are statistically significant. And finally, 
the equation for training expenditures obtains the worst results, with a Wald test with a 
p-value of 0.109 and the unemployment rate as the only significant IV. Overall, the strength 
of these variables as instruments might be deemed as not quite satisfactory, which provides 
an avenue for future work. 
In the second stage we have estimated equation (9) adding as a covariate the vector 
of estimated residuals from the first stage, using a pooled probit QMLE. Table 11 contains the 
results for this second stage. The first column reports the baseline regression estimated with 
a dynamic RE probit model, while the second column reports estimates using the pooled 
probit QMLE, in order to check the comparability of both estimation methods. In short, the 
estimated coefficients are quite similar and we detect that those from the QMLE are a bit 
lower. The last column shows the estimates when human capital variables are allowed to be 
endogenous. First of all, the Wald test on the joint significance of vˆ it leads to reject, with a 
zero p-value to the three decimal places, which provides evidence against the null hypothesis 
that human resource management variables are exogenous. If we look at the individual 
coefficients for these residuals, the failure of exogeneity would seem to come from training 
expenditures, the only residual statistically significant. 
As regards the rest of estimated parameters, they are quite similar, both quantitative42 
and qualitatively, although there are some remarkable differences. The coefficient on the 
skilled labour variable is lower in the endogenous case, and it also loses its statistical 
significance, while on the other hand, that for training expenditures increases fivefold and 
becomes significant. The parameter on temporary employment roughly doubles and retains 
its significance. Overall, these results show that care should be taken in using human 
resource management variables in order to explain firms’ innovation behavior, since they are 
likely to be endogenous. 
5.4 Further Robustness Analysis 
Some further sensitivity analyses are carried out in this section in order to check the 
robustness of our results and explore some additional issues. Firstly, we have built an 
expanded balanced panel which extended from 2000 to 2007, but with only over 500 firms. 
We have estimated our baseline specification again for the period 2003-2007 but, in this 
                                                                          
40. We have also tried other interesting instrumental variables, such as the share of young people by province, 
the sector volatility of real sales or per-student public expenditure on education by region, but they were not significantly 
correlated with human capital variables. 
41. Results are available upon request. 
42. Note that quantitative comparisons are facilitated by the fact that the scale factor is similar. 
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case, in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity using a correlated RE framework, 
we have used the time average of the covariates for the period 2000-2002, instead of just the 
covariates in 2002. This exercise barely affected the results; hence, they are not reported 
here, but are available upon request. 
Secondly, we have run the baseline regression and regressions in Tables 12 and 13 
replacing our preferred measure of spillovers —R&D intensity— with the stock of R&D. 
The results are quite similar and are available upon request. Thirdly, we run the baseline 
regression substituting our reference measure of spillovers, so that we can check whether 
we could detect other relevant spillovers besides those coming from firms in the same sector 
of activity. In order to do this, we built two other stocks of knowledge capital using aggregate 
national statistics from INE, the National Statistics Institute: one stock of knowledge capital 
from public sector institutions43 in the same region of the firm (k pub-ca) —and no matter the 
sector— and other stock of private knowledge capital of all firms in the same region 
(k priv-ca), irrespective of their sector of activity. Table 12 shows that these two types of 
technology capital seem to generate relevant knowledge spillovers for the decision to invest in 
R&D, both alone and when interacted with the absorptive capacity variable. An additional 
implication is that not only industry spillovers matter —the traditional focus in most of the 
literature—, but those coming from the public research sector and from firms in other 
industries (in the same region) matter as well.44 
In line with Máñez-Castillejo et al. (2004), we have also computed the share of 
innovative firms in the same sector of activity across the whole country, as well as in the same 
region where the firm is located, irrespective of the industry, in order to account for 
industry-specific spillovers and region-specific spillovers. Most of the literature emphasizes 
the role of spillovers within the industry, given the technological proximity, but a number of 
papers suggest that geographical proximity generates positive externalities, market linkages 
and possibilities for cooperation that, in turn, encourage innovation activities. Again, what we 
find (Table 12, columns 4 and 5) is that technological spillovers, both at the industry or 
regional level, only matter as long as you have previous experience in R&D, or in other words, 
absorptive capacity. 
Overall, these results would be consistent with Jaffe (1986), Harhoff (2000) and 
Beneito (2001), who found positive significant effects of spillovers to the extent that this 
variable was combined with the own level of knowledge capital, which can be interpreted 
as a measure of a firm’s absorptive capacity. 
Finally, we have checked the sensitivity of our results to different measures of the 
dependent variable since, as it is well known, R&D expenditures may not be a good proxy for 
innovation. In order to do this we have merged our database with the PITEC database, which 
results in a balanced panel of around 460 firms for the period 2003-2007. PITEC is an 
interesting database because we can use total innovation expenditures instead of only R&D 
expenditures to generate the dependent variable,45 which, obviously, is a better proxy for the 
                                                                          
43. We capitalize R&D expenditures from public sector institutions and from the higher education sector, in line with 
previous literature (see Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe 2004). This makes sense since the public sector controls 
the budget —and even the research agenda— of higher education institutions in most countries. 
44. When all measures of knowledge capital are included together, then only industry spillovers are significant and the 
interaction with R&D intensity becomes non-significant. This may be due to the fact that the three measures are highly 
correlated. 
45. R&D expenditures account for around 43% of total innovation expenditures, and both variables have a correlation 
coefficient of 0.49 in this particular subsample. 
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decision to innovate. Besides, and contrary to other variables in similar databases, we have 
the data year by year, without overlapping, which would introduce artificial persistence. 
As can be seen in Table 13 (second column) the results are reasonably similar and, 
in particular, the interaction between spillovers and absorptive capacity remains highly 
significant. The rest of covariates lose a bit of significance, probably due to the fact that we 
are working with a smaller sample in both time and individuals dimensions. 
We have also used another interesting dependent variable from PITEC, Innofin, 
which is a dummy variable that equals one whenever a firm is currently involved in an 
innovative project that has not been finished yet or has just abandoned a research project. 
Again, this information is available on a yearly basis which avoids overlapping. Table 13 
(third column) shows that the main thrust of our results remains unaltered: the interaction 
between the stock of private industry knowledge capital and the firms’ R&D intensity, 
the share of skilled-labour and the portion of temporary workers are statistically significant 
with the expected signs. 
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6 Conclusions 
We have studied the role played by knowledge spillovers and firms’ absorptive capacity, as 
well as by the quality of human capital, in the decision to innovate using data on Spanish firms 
for the period 2003-2007. In order to do this, we have used the estimator proposed by 
Wooldridge (2005) for dynamic binary choice panel data models. The empirical exercise has 
provided some evidence on the positive relationship between spillovers and firms’ innovative 
behaviour, a relation which is enhanced for those firms with a higher capacity to absorb those 
spillovers. The results also confirm and highlight the role of some human resource 
management practices on the dynamics of firms’ inventive performance. 
The basic result from the analysis of spillover effects is that they are relevant not just 
for the knowledge generated in the same industry, but also for that generated in the same 
region and in different industries throughout the country. Moreover, it has been shown that 
the capacity to assimilate those spillovers may not only work through firms’ R&D capabilities 
—as traditionally envisaged—, but through such factors as the quality of the labour force, 
the share of temporary employment and the amount of resources spent in training, as well. 
Indeed, our results suggest that the effects of skilled labour and of on-the-job training work 
mainly through its impact on firm’s absorptive capacity. In addition to these factors, we have 
found that innovation performance exhibits true state dependence and that unobserved 
heterogeneity plays an important role in explaining the persistence of innovation. Further, 
some other observed firm characteristics, such as size, sales growth, export behaviour, 
sector capital intensity or financial variables (like the equity share, the percentage of 
short-term liabilities or the portion of banking loans), are also found to be related with the 
likelihood of innovation. 
From an economic policy point of view, the distinction between permanent 
innovation activities due to firm-specific factors as opposed to true state dependence has 
important implications for innovation policy, as argued by Peters (2005). If innovation 
performance shows true state dependence, policies such as government support 
programmes are supposed to have a more profound effect, because they not only affect the 
current innovation activities but are likely to induce a permanent change in favour of 
innovation. If, on the contrary, individual heterogeneity induces persistent behaviour, support 
programmes are unlikely to have long-lasting effects and economic policy should concentrate 
more on measures which have the potential to improve innovation-relevant firm-specific 
factors. 
Further, and in particular for the Spanish economy, our results would provide an 
additional argument in favour of tackling the high prevalence of temporary employment, since 
it seems to be detrimental for firms’ innovation performance. Moreover, given the fact that 
Spanish firms are not only lagging behind R&D spending, but also in the skill qualification of its 
workforce and in on-the-job training, it will not be enough to devote large quantities of public 
resources to support R&D activities; policy-makers have as well to make sure that Spanish 
corporations are able to benefit from that effort. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Central de Balances coverage rates 
 
 
Table 2: Sample description (I) 
 
 
 
Database coverage1, 2005
Value-added Employment Wages
Energy 71.3 57.5 79.1
Industry 28.5 18.1 27.4
Mkt. Services 20.4 23.7 26.3
Other 2 7.6 6.7 10.2
1 Ratio CB firms'  to National Accounts' non-financial sector aggregate
2 Includes agriculture and construction
Period average
Extended Res tricted CB-PITEC
Number of firms 2565 787 470
Number of observations 23082 4722 1340
Minimum nº of consecutive obs. per firm 4 6 5
Median nº of consecutive obs. per firm 8 6 5
Balanced? no yes yes
% innovating 24.9 25.2 35.8
Sector distribution
energy & utilities 4.3 6.1 5.1
industry 38.9 36.2 46.9
market services 38.5 39.7 31.9
other1 18.3 18 16.1
Size distribution
SMEs2 53.6 47.7 27.5
Large 46.4 52.3 72.6
% exporting 57.8 58.6 71.1
% stock market 7 7.1 9.7
1Includes extraction, agriculture, fishing and construction
2250 or less employees
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sector Observations % of total % R&D>0 Observations % of total % R&D>0 Observations % of total % R&D>0
Agriculture and forestry 288 1.25 19.44 33 0.70 27.27 1 0.04 100.00
Fishing 4 0.02 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Extraction of fuels 165 0.71 37.58 30 0.64 36.67 10 0.43 50.00
Extraction of other minerals 46 0.20 21.74 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 1793 7.77 25.21 311 6.59 26.69 174 7.40 35.06
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 142 0.62 72.54 36 0.76 80.56 20 0.85 65.00
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 1759 7.62 59.86 341 7.22 62.46 222 9.45 68.47
Manufacture of other minerals 795 3.44 30.82 127 2.69 27.56 96 4.09 25.00
Manufacture of basic metals 1147 4.97 37.05 268 5.68 37.69 185 7.87 39.46
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 821 3.56 57.25 138 2.92 70.29 83 3.53 83.13
Manufacture of electrical equipment 875 3.79 59.77 135 2.86 57.78 90 3.83 64.44
Manufacture of transport equipment 1052 4.56 43.16 210 4.45 48.57 140 5.96 58.57
Manufacture of textiles 747 3.24 20.62 122 2.58 29.51 85 3.62 34.12
Manufacture of articles of fur, leather and footwear 129 0.56 20.16 36 0.76 22.22 20 0.85 30.00
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork 214 0.93 23.83 36 0.76 50.00 25 1.06 60.00
Manufacture of paper and paper products 698 3.02 15.62 176 3.73 19.32 85 3.62 20.00
Manufacture of rubber 383 1.66 33.68 66 1.40 31.82 45 1.91 37.78
Other manufactures 361 1.56 27.70 54 1.14 16.67 25 1.06 28.00
Energy, gas and water 533 2.31 45.40 162 3.43 37.65 65 2.77 69.23
Water collection, treatment and supply 461 2.00 10.20 128 2.71 10.94 55 2.34 16.36
Construction 1624 7.04 12.13 275 5.82 9.82 90 3.83 21.11
Trade 3813 16.52 7.76 850 18.00 10.94 374 15.91 16.04
Transport and communications 1780 7.71 9.44 437 9.25 10.53 175 7.45 19.43
Hotels and restaurants 646 2.80 1.08 168 3.56 0.00 60 2.55 0.00
Real state and other professional services 2806 12.16 13.15 583 12.35 11.49 225 9.57 20.00
Total 23082 100 24.90 4722 100 25.20 2350 100 35.80
Extended Restricted CB-PITEC 
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Observations % of total % with R&D>0 Observations % of total % with R&D>0 Observations % of total % with R&D>0
Andalucia 1444 6.26 12.26 216 4.57 8.80 70 2.98 14.29
Aragon 639 2.77 26.13 144 3.05 35.42 90 3.83 45.56
Asturias 535 2.32 19.07 108 2.29 10.19 55 2.34 16.36
Baleares 387 1.68 6.72 92 1.95 2.17 20 0.85 0.00
Canarias 560 2.43 6.43 102 2.16 0.98 15 0.64 0.00
Cantabria 274 1.19 26.64 66 1.40 27.27 30 1.28 50.00
Castilla La Mancha 329 1.43 19.15 84 1.78 23.81 35 1.49 48.57
Castilla y Leon 679 2.94 33.28 182 3.85 35.71 78 3.32 48.72
Cataluña 5674 24.58 29.56 1330 28.17 26.02 697 29.66 35.87
Com. Valenciana 1905 8.25 20.68 306 6.48 25.49 135 5.74 34.07
Extremadura 34 0.15 64.71 6 0.13 100.00 5 0.21 100.00
Galicia 826 3.58 15.98 138 2.92 18.12 55 2.34 29.09
La Rioja 67 0.29 19.40 14 0.30 0.00 7 0.30 0.00
Madrid 7193 31.16 25.34 1358 28.76 26.36 723 30.77 34.44
Murcia 401 1.74 9.98 102 2.16 13.73 55 2.34 21.82
Navarra 442 1.91 31.00 98 2.08 34.69 62 2.64 46.77
País Vasco 1656 7.17 38.65 364 7.71 39.56 218 9.28 47.71
Ceuta y Melilla 37 0.16 0.00 12 0.25 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Total 23082 100 24.9 4722 100 25.2 2350 100 35.8
detcirtseRdetcirtseRdednetxE
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1015
Table 5 
 
 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION
Variable  Definition
Alternative endogenous variables
Innovation =1 if a firm i has positive R&D expenditures in year t. These expenditure include those outlays 
incurred to discover new knowledge and to develop that knowledge into a design for a new product 
or a new productive process.
Inno_exp =1 if a firm i has positive innovation expenditures in year t. These include R&D spending, acquisiton 
of external knowledge, machines and equipment, training, market introduction, design and other 
preparations for product and/or process innovations. Data from PITEC
Innofin =1 if firm i has an innovative project that has been abandoned or has not been finalized yet as of 
date t. Data from PITEC
Explanatory variables
Size Number of employees of firm i in year t-1, in logs
Age Age of firm i in year t-1 compue as the difference between the current year and the year of 
foundation, in logs
Sales growth Growth rate of real sales of firm i in year t-1, deflated with a value-added deflator
Sectoral K-intensity Per-industry average of fixed-physical assets per worker in year t-1, deflated with value-added 
deflator, in logs
Foreign ownership =1 if a foreing firm has a share in firm i's equity in year t-1 
Export =1 if firm i reports positive sales in foreing markets in year t-1
Subsidies to K =1 if firm i reports receiving positive subsidies to fixed-physical assets from either the Spanish public 
sector or the EU in year t-1
Patents-ca Number of patents in the same region than firm i in year t-1, computed with data from INE for the 
whole economy
Kpriv-sec Aggregate stock of knowledge capital for the private business sector at a sectoral level in year t-1, in 
logs, computed with data from INE for the whole economy
Kpub-ca Aggregate stock of knowledge capital for the public sector at a regional level in year t-1, in logs, 
computed with data from INE for the whole economy
Kpriv-ca Aggregate stock of knowledge capital for the private business sector at a regional level in year t-1, in 
logs, computed with data from INE for the whole economy
Kpriv-sec*R&D intensity Product of (log) Kpriv-sec and the ratio of R&D expenditures over sales of firm i, lagged one year; the 
same holds for Kpub-ca and Kpriv-ca
%Innovfirm-sec Percentage of innovative firms (R&D>0) in the same industry than firm i in year t-1
%Innovfirm-ca Percentage of innovative firms (R&D>0) in the same region than firm i in year t-1
%Skilled-labour Percentage of managers, professionals and technicians in total employment in firm i in year t-1
%Fixed-term labour Percentage of employees on a temporary contract in firm i in year t-1
Training spending Real training expenditures per employee in firm i in year t-1, deflated with value-added deflator
Equity/Liabilities Ratio of equity to the sum of equity and liabilities of firm i in year t-1
%Short-term liabilities Ratio of short-term liabilities to total liabilities for firm i in year t-1
%Banking liabilities Ratio of bank loans to total liabilities for firm i in year t-1
Concentration Market share of the first decile of firms with larger sales by year and industry, lagged one year 
Market share Market share of firm i's sales in year t-1
Import penetration Share of imports in total sales by industry in year t-1
Instrumental variables
%Women Share of women aged 15-64 in total population, by province. Source: INE (National Statistics 
Office), "Padrón Municipal" (municipal census) 
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate by province. Source: INE, Labour Force Survey (EPA)
%Higher educ. Share of people with terciary and upper-level vocational training education by region. Source: INE, 
Labour Force Survey (EPA)
%Immigrants Share of immigrants on total population, by region. Source: INE, Municipal Census
Firm-level coll. barg. Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has a firm-level collective agreement. Source: Statistics on 
Collective Agreements, Minsitry of Labour and Immigration
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Table 6 
 
  
Transition probabilities
Innovation status in t: Innovation = 0 Innovation = 1 Total Innovation = 0 Innovation = 1 Total
Innovation = 0 97.1 2.9 100 95.8 4.2 100
Innovation = 1 10.5 89.5 100 10.9 89.1 100
Total 74.9 25.1 100 74.3 25.7 100
Innovation status in t+1:
Balanced panel
(2002-2007)
Unbalanced panel
(1991-2007)
Transition probabilities for innovation expenditures (PITEC)
Innovation status in t: Innovation = 0 Innovation = 1 Total
Innovation = 0 86.2 13.8 100
Innovation = 1 6.2 93.8 100
Total 34 66 100
(2003-2007)
Innovation status in t+1:
Balanced panel
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics for relevant variables
Variable Unit Mean Min Max
Overall Between Within
Innovation 1/0 0.251 0.434 0.398 0.173 0 1
Size logs 5.84 1.44 1.43 0.160 2.20 9.31
Age years 35.58 28.03 28.01 1.41 1 217
Sales growth y-o-y %ch. 3.34 23.57 9.93 21.37 -262.53 297.22
Sectoral K-intensity logs 4.58 1.65 1.59 0.45 -0.59 9.06
Foreign ownership 1/0 0.202 0.402 0.386 0.114 0 1
Export 1/0 0.588 0.492 0.477 0.124 0 1
Subsidies to K 1/0 0.272 0.445 0.352 0.273 0 1
Patents-ca nº pat. 440.87 256.42 254.31 35.73 0 752
Kpriv-sec logs 13.56 1.58 1.55 0.307 10.00 16.67
Kpub-ca logs 14.41 1.09 1.08 0.159 7.25 15.57
Kpriv-ca logs 14.64 1.47 1.46 0.173 4.14 15.90
Kpriv-sec*R&D intensity logs 0.060 0.198 0.186 0.068 0 1.47
Kpriv-sec*%Skilled-L logs 3.22 3.27 3.18 0.770 0.003 15.61
Kpriv-sec*%Temp-L logs 2.34 2.91 2.82 0.726 0 16.01
Kpriv-sec*Training-exp logs 1.86 4.24 3.65 2.14 0 68.00
%Innovfirm-sec % 25.11 19.60 19.07 4.60 0 83.33
%Innovfirm-ca % 25.11 9.47 9.11 2.61 0 100
%Skilled-labour % 23.28 22.35 21.74 5.25 0.02 93.65
%Fixed-term labour % 17.19 20.85 20.13 5.48 0 96.01
Training spending logs 0.135 0.308 0.264 0.159 0 5.70
Equity/Liabilities % 67.51 26.32 24.34 10.06 6.87 100
%Short-term liabilities % 56.85 35.97 31.87 17.44 0 100
%Banking liabilities % 59.65 42.11 38.35 17.85 0 100
Concentration % 61.45 12.22 11.79 36.47 34.05 83.75
Market share % 1.77 3.54 3.46 0.76 0.01 18.60
Import penetration % 22.71 23.25 22.61 5.46 0 74.71
Std. Dev.
Estimation sample (2003-2007)
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Table 8 
Baseline regression: comparing static pooled, static RE and dynamic RE probit models
Pooled Pooled Static RE Static RE Dynamic RE Dynamic RE 
(1991-2007) (1991-2007) only y(i,0) y(i,0) and x(i,0)
Innovation(t-1) --- --- --- --- 2.197*** 2.261***
0.187 0.211
Innovation(t=0) --- --- --- --- 0.996*** 0.887***
0.311 0.350
Size 0.211*** 0.281*** 0.533*** 0.648*** 0.133** 0.334
0.048 0.029 0.108 0.049 0.054 0.237
Age -0.053 0.003 0.010 0.060 -0.050 0.311
0.059 0.032 0.124 0.057 0.048 0.348
Sales growth 0.269* 0.169*** 0.317 0.134 0.410** 0.430**
0.151 0.048 0.253 0.084 0.199 0.205
Sectoral K-intensity -0.034 -0.021 -0.043 0.044 -0.071* 0.084
0.045 0.022 0.080 0.034 0.044 0.084
Foreign ownership -0.148 -0.133** -0.301 -0.119 -0.008 -0.258
0.125 0.065 0.217 0.091 0.118 0.238
Export (yes/no) 0.669*** 0.554*** 1.001*** 0.754*** 0.252* 0.119
0.136 0.071 0.255 0.091 0.137 0.269
Subsidies to K (yes/no) 0.263*** 0.293*** 0.185 0.156** 0.172* 0.182
0.090 0.051 0.142 0.063 0.105 0.120
Patents per region -0.0004** --- -0.0007* --- -0.0005** -0.002*
0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.001
Kpriv-sec 0.209** --- 0.324* --- 0.271** 0.104
0.104 0.182 0.128 0.160
Kpriv-sec * R&D intensity 8.891*** --- 8.168*** --- 1.309*** 1.128**
1.568 0.767 0.401 0.502
%Skilled-labour 0.842*** 1.020*** 1.654*** 1.030*** 0.475* -0.113
0.273 0.141 0.517 0.204 0.270 0.574
%Fixed-term labour -0.640** -0.397*** -1.149** -0.893*** -0.804** -1.211**
0.325 0.133 0.590 0.185 0.346 0.610
Training spending -0.089*** 0.143* -0.081 0.180*** 0.051 0.046
0.032 0.087 0.053 0.055 0.037 0.047
Equity/Liabilities 0.182 0.280*** 0.801** 0.483*** 0.372* 0.656*
0.192 0.095 0.361 0.128 0.205 0.347
%Short term liabilities -0.168 -0.141** -0.445** -0.091 -0.326** -0.458**
0.124 0.069 0.226 0.080 0.142 0.196
%Banking liabilities 0.360*** 0.174*** 0.592*** 0.269*** 0.223* 0.403**
0.116 0.064 0.209 0.075 0.127 0.184
Concentration -2.466 -2.952 -0.305 -3.761 5.238 8.010
5.048 2.073 10.221 2.882 9.301 9.423
Concentration^2 2.408 2.670 1.688 3.940 -3.111 -6.062
4.253 1.802 8.509 2.529 7.711 7.815
Market share 2.901* -1.211 2.272 -2.641 1.554 -3.495
1.697 1.212 3.486 1.655 1.802 4.341
Import penetration -0.289 -0.742** -0.987 -1.357*** -0.484 -0.328
0.591 0.295 1.096 0.443 0.904 0.992
VK --- --- 2.118 2.303 0.464 0.367
0.159 0.078 0.185 0.241
U --- --- 0.818 0.841 0.177 0.119
0.022 0.009 0.116 0.137
LRU(p-value) --- --- 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.202
Scale factor for APE 0.181 0.244 0.091 0.105 0.086 0.084
Wald-heterogeneity (p-value) --- --- --- --- --- 0.640
Firms 742 2511 769 2512 769 740
Observations 3550 16590 3682 16592 3682 3603
***, ** and * denote stat ist ical signif icance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in pooled probit  adjusted for clustering on f irms. 
Time and industry dummies are included in each regression, but  not  reported. LRU is a Likelihood-rat io test for U=0.
The scale factor allows to obtain the APE of each variable by mult iplying this factor by the est imated coef f icient .
Wald-heterogeneity is a Wald test on the joint signif icance of x(i,0), the explanatory variables in t=0.
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Table 9 
 
Impact of human capital variables on absorptive capacity
Dynamic RE probit model
Baseline Skilled-labour Temporary Training 
(R&D invest.) employment expenditures
Innovation(t-1) 2.197*** 2.351*** 2.370*** 2.353***
0.187 0.176 0.176 0.178
Innovation(t=0) 0.996*** 1.106*** 1.059*** 1.031***
0.311 0.332 0.328 0.327
Size 0.133** 0.135** 0.141*** 0.141***
0.054 0.055 0.055 0.054
Age -0.050 -0.051 -0.045 -0.046
0.048 0.059 0.058 0.057
Sales growth 0.410** 0.415** 0.401** 0.388*
0.199 0.199 0.198 0.199
Sectoral K-intensity -0.071* -0.085* -0.083* -0.074*
0.044 0.045 0.044 0.044
Foreign ownership -0.008 0.004 0.003 -0.002
0.118 0.119 0.118 0.116
Export (yes/no) 0.252* 0.234* 0.236* 0.221*
0.137 0.139 0.138 0.136
Subsidies to K (yes/no) 0.172* 0.150 0.162 0.174*
0.105 0.107 0.105 0.105
Patents per region -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005**
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Kpriv-sec 0.271** 0.194 0.308** 0.276**
0.128 0.135 0.136 0.129
Kpriv-sec * Aborptive cap. 1.309*** 0.291** -0.132 0.031***
0.401 0.144 0.178 0.010
%Skilled-labour 0.475* -3.521* 0.551** 0.451*
0.270 2.023 0.267 0.267
%Fixed-term labour -0.804** -0.879** 0.922 -0.814**
0.346 0.357 2.441 0.347
Training spending 0.051 0.070* 0.067* 0.052
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037
Equity/Liabilities 0.372* 0.361* 0.378* 0.357*
0.205 0.207 0.205 0.202
%Short term liabilities -0.326** -0.349** -0.353** -0.311**
0.142 0.144 0.142 0.141
%Banking liabilities 0.223* 0.221* 0.218* 0.226*
0.127 0.128 0.127 0.126
Concentration 5.238 5.383 6.796 5.757
9.301 9.438 9.371 9.431
Concentration^2 -3.111 -3.274 -4.335 -3.396
7.711 7.289 7.766 7.839
Market share 1.554 1.262 0.845 0.770
1.802 1.849 1.818 1.793
Import penetration -0.484 -0.436 -0.475 -0.539
0.904 0.909 0.908 0.903
VK 0.464 0.501 0.482 0.454
0.185 0.186 0.188 0.194
U 0.177 0.200 0.188 0.171
0.116 0.119 0.119 0.121
LRU(p-value) 0.070 0.053 0.064 0.086
Scale factor for APE 0.086 0.087 0.087 0.087
Firms 769 769 769 769
Observations 3682 3682 3682 3682
***, ** and * denote stat ist ical signif icance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respect ively. 
Time and industry dummies are included in each regression, but not reported. LRU is a Likelihood-rat io test for U=0.
The scale factor allows to obtain the APE of  each variable by mult iplying this factor by the est imated coeff icient .
Absorptive capacity variables:
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Table 10 
 
Magnitude of the effects of some relevant variables
Variables Sample avg. Assumed change APE Effect on P(y=1)
R&D investment:
- Direct effect (innova(t-1)) 0.251 P(1/1)-P(1/0) 0.473 47.3
- Indirect effect (spillover*abs. capacity) 0.060 10% 0.113 1.13
Spillovers:
- Sectoral stock of R&D capital 10% 0.023 0.23
Human capital variables:  
- %Fixed-term labour 0.172 -10% -0.069 0.69
- %Skilled-labour 0.233 10% 0.041 0.41
- Training expenditures 0.135 10% 0.004 0.04
Financial variables:
- Equity ratio 0.675 10% 0.032 0.32
- %Short-term liabilities 0.569 -10% -0.028 0.28
- %Bank financing 0.597 10% 0.019 0.19
Note: Computed using our preferred specification.
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Table 11 
Estimates allowing human capital variables to be endogenous
Baseline regression Instrumental variables
Dynamic RE Pooled QMLE Pooled QMLE
probit model probit model probit model
Innovation(t-1) 2.197*** 2.398*** 2.512***
0.187 0.121 0.139
Innovation(t=0) 0.996*** 0.601*** 0.625***
0.311 0.127 0.147
Size 0.133** 0.108*** 0.158***
0.054 0.038 0.057
Age -0.050 -0.048 -0.059
0.048 0.051 0.059
Sales growth 0.410** 0.405** 0.369*
0.199 0.173 0.216
Sectoral K-intensity -0.071* -0.070* -0.089**
0.044 0.038 0.045
Foreign ownership -0.008 -0.0003 -0.030
0.118 0.104 0.125
Export (yes/no) 0.252* 0.236** 0.260**
0.137 0.112 0.127
Subsidies to K 0.172* 0.169* 0.167
0.105 0.093 0.107
Patents per region -0.0005** -0.0004** -0.0005***
0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Kpriv-sec 0.271** 0.244* 0.234
0.128 0.133 0.147
Kpriv-sec * R&D intensity 1.309*** 1.147*** 1.018**
0.401 0.319 0.403
%Skilled-labour 0.475* 0.414* 0.266
0.270 0.215 0.685
Residual skilled-labour 0.271
0.732
%Fixed-term labour -0.804** -0.674** -1.509**
0.346 0.274 0.757
Residual fixed-term labour 0.967
0.762
Training spending 0.051 0.043 0.217***
0.037 0.029 0.046
Residual training spending -0.247***
0.045
Equity/Liabilities 0.372* 0.312* 0.334*
0.205 0.166 0.193
%Short term liabilities -0.326** -0.286** -0.280**
0.142 0.119 0.140
%Banking liabilities 0.223* 0.189* 0.201
0.127 0.110 0.139
Concentration 5.238 4.684 5.962
9.301 7.372 8.910
Concentration^2 -3.111 -2.875 -4.118
7.711 5.842 7.000
Market share 1.554 1.402 -0.008
1.802 1.390 1.979
Import penetration -0.484 -0.435 -0.399
0.904 0.881 0.963
Wald exogeneity (p-value) 0.000
Scale factor for APE 0.086 0.086 0.084
Firms 769 769 767
Observations 3682 3682 3674
***, ** and * denote stat ist ical signif icance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Time and industry dummies are included in each regression, but not reported. 
The scale factor allows to obtain the APE of  each variable by mult iplying this factor by the est imated coeff icient .
The instrumental variables are the share of  women, the unemployment rate, the share of people with at  least  Secondary Education and 
the share of immigrants, all computed by province, and a dummy variable that equals one when a f irm has a f irm-level collect ive
bargaining agreement. The standard errors for the pooled QM LE are robust  and, for the instrumental variables case, are obtained by
bootstrapping all the f irms using 500 bootstrap replicat ions. Wald exogeneity is a Wald test for the joint  signif icance of  the coeff icient
for the residuals in the second stage regression.
Exogenous regressors
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 47 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1015
Table 12 
 
Impact of different measures of aggregate spillovers
Dynamic RE probit model
Baseline K pub-ca K priv-ca % innovating firms % innovating firms 
(Kpriv-sec) same sector same CA
Innovation(t-1) 2.197*** 2.178*** 2.168*** 2.277*** 2.176***
0.187 0.188 0.188 0.192 0.188
Innovation(t=0) 0.996*** 0.984*** 0.981*** 0.979*** 0.943***
0.311 0.310 0.308 0.328 0.303
Size 0.133** 0.121** 0.110** 0.128** .123**
0.054 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.052
Age -0.050 -0.049 -0.041 -0.051 -0.045
0.048 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.056
Sales growth 0.410** 0.404** 0.401** 0.390** 0.392**
0.199 0.198 0.199 0.197 0.196
Sectoral K-intensity -0.071* -0.073* -0.073* -0.070* -0.066
0.044 0.044 0.044 0.043 0.043
Foreign ownership -0.008 0.004 0.004 0.027 0.010
0.118 0.116 0.117 0.115 0.115
Export (yes/no) 0.252* 0.245* 0.227* 0.244* 0.216
0.137 0.135 0.137 0.134 0.134
Subsidies to K 0.172* 0.181* 0.187* 0.172* 0.183*
0.105 0.104 0.105 0.103 0.103
Patents per region -0.0005** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.0005** -0.0005**
0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002
Spillover variable 0.271** 0.140* 0.230*** -0.006 0.010
0.128 0.085 0.087 0.009 0.006
Spillover var. * R&D intensity 1.309*** 1.364*** 1.342*** 0.340*** 0.741***
0.401 0.401 0.394 0.123 0.218
%Skilled-labour 0.475* 0.433 0.411 0.511** 0.472*
0.270 0.268 0.269 0.263 0.265
%Fixed-term labour -0.804** -0.789** -0.737** -0.869** -0.753**
0.346 0.340 0.341 0.342 0.339
Training spending 0.051 0.048 0.049 0.053 0.049
0.037 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
Equity/Liabilities 0.372* 0.383* 0.362* 0.377* 0.363*
0.205 0.203 0.203 0.201 0.201
%Short term liabilities -0.326** -0.323** -0.323** -0.321** -0.301**
0.142 0.141 0.142 0.140 0.139
%Banking liabilities 0.223* 0.238* 0.256** 0.213* 0.225*
0.127 0.127 0.128 0.125 0.124
Concentration 5.238 5.245 5.502 5.116 5.874
9.301 9.327 9.319 9.417 9.345
Concentration^2 -3.111 -3.889 -4.082 -3.898 -4.360
7.711 7.741 7.727 7.781 7.760
Market share 1.554 1.340 1.278 1.341 1.552
1.802 1.784 1.780 1.769 1.751
Import penetration -0.484 -1.077 -1.046 -1.137 -1.039
0.904 0.879 0.878 0.894 0.880
VK 0.464 0.447 0.446 0.438 0.424
0.185 0.188 0.188 0.201 0.190
U 0.177 0.167 0.166 0.161 0.152
0.116 0.117 0.117 0.124 0.116
LRU(p-value) 0.070 0.083 0.083 0.103 0.098
Scale factor for APE 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.087 0.086
Firms 769 769 769 769 769
Observations 3682 3682 3682 3682 3682
***, ** and * denote stat ist ical signif icance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Time and industry dummies are included in each regression, but  not  reported. LRU is a Likelihood-rat io test for U=0.
The scale factor allows to obtain the APE of each variable by mult iplying this factor by the est imated coef f icient .
Spillover variables:
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Table 13 
 
Different definitions of innovation
Dynamic RE probit model
Baseline Innovation Innofin (current or
(R&D invest.>0) expenditures>0  abandoned)
Innovation(t-1) 2.197*** 1.337*** 0.915***
0.187 0.195 0.137
Innovation(t=0) 0.996*** 1.630*** 0.964***
0.311 0.357 0.179
Size 0.133** 0.160* 0.081
0.054 0.089 0.063
Age -0.050 0.079 0.027
0.048 0.098 0.068
Sales growth 0.410** 0.083 0.363
0.199 0.332 0.263
Sectoral K-intensity -0.071* -0.072 0.016
0.044 0.065 0.049
Foreign ownership -0.008 -0.198 -0.074
0.118 0.186 0.125
Export (yes/no) 0.252* 0.402** 0.366**
0.137 0.196 0.148
Subsidies to K 0.172* 0.300* 0.269**
0.105 0.159 0.109
Patents per region -0.0005** -0.0002 -0.000
0.0002 0.0003 0.000
Kpriv-sec 0.271** -0.042 0.104
0.128 0.212 0.153
Kpriv-sec * R&D intensity 1.309*** 5.645*** 0.886***
0.401 1.557 0.313
%Skilled-labour 0.475* 0.495 0.712**
0.270 0.414 0.298
%Fixed-term labour -0.804** -0.669 -0.802**
0.346 0.460 0.355
Training spending 0.051 0.008 0.042
0.037 0.049 0.037
Equity/Liabilities 0.372* 0.094 -0.055
0.205 0.301 0.224
%Short term liabilities -0.326** -0.358* -0.190
0.142 0.211 0.148
%Banking liabilities 0.223* 0.028 0.175
0.127 0.185 0.132
Concentration 5.238 -31.040** -10.257
9.301 12.745 9.391
Concentration^2 -3.111 27.703*** 9.404
7.711 10.450 7.757
Market share 1.554 5.997 6.252***
1.802 3.768 2.342
Import penetration -0.484 0.950 0.309
0.904 1.241 0.932
VK 0.464 0.859 0.660
0.185 0.175 0.121
U 0.177 0.425 0.303
0.116 0.100 0.078
LRU(p-value) 0.070 0.000 0.000
Scale factor for APE 0.086 0.118 0.214
Firms 769 462 462
Observations 3682 1790 1790
***, ** and * denote stat ist ical signif icance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respect ively. 
Time and industry dummies are included in each regression, but not reported. LRU is a Likelihood-rat io test  for U=0.
The scale factor allows to obtain the APE of each variable by mult iplying this factor by the est imated coeff icient.
1/  Data for these regressions span 2004-2007
Alternative dependent variables: 1/
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ANNEX A: Computing Partial Effects 
One problem in estimating partial effects is the fact that firm-specific heterogeneity is 
unobservable. In the case of a continuous covariate case, we would like to compute: 
 
A1) 
which clearly depends on the distribution of Ki (or, equivalently, ai).  
Hence, the literature has proposed two alternative calculation methods to deal with 
this shortcoming. The usual way to compute the partial effects is to calculate the so called 
partial effects at the average (PEA) by assuming that the individual heterogeneity takes its 
average value, which can be calculated, in our particular setting, as: 
 
A2) 
Therefore, the estimated PEA, which would employ sample statistics for population analogs, 
would take the form: 
 
A3) 
The PEA, however, has the drawback that usually the average value is not 
representative of a large share of the firms. Alternatively, one can estimate the average partial 
effect (APE), which results from averaging the unobserved heterogeneity across firms. In other 
words, you can compute the partial effect for the average individual in your sample (the PEA) 
or the average of all individual partial effects across time in your sample (the APE). In analytical 
form, the estimated APE is: 
 
A4) 
where the subscript “a” denotes that the original parameters have been scaled by (1+Va2)-0.5. 
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